Climate Knowledge and Power: Tales of Skeptic Tanks, Weather Gods, and Sagas for Climate (In)justice

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The world is uneven. The extent of the empirical case for growing, widespread global inequality is so extreme that some scholars characterize the present world configuration as one defined by *global apartheid*. Tariq Banuri observes that the planet is one big underdeveloped nation, where wealth and resources are concentrated in the hands of a shrinking minority, while immiseration and injustice are socialized and widespread. It is against this backdrop that negotiations to manage the world's climate unfold.

The 2007 release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) announcement noted: "there is at least a 90 percent chance that human activities, mainly burning fossil fuels, are to blame for most of the warming in the last 50 years." In the previous report, in 2001, the IPCC said the link was at least 66 percent certain. On the eve of the release of the 2007 report, one day before U.S. President George W. Bush's State of the Union address, a gaggle of U.S. industry and environmental non-governmental leaders organized under the catchy title US-CAP, which stands for U.S. Climate Action Partnership, called for a reduction of atmospheric CO_2 to 100-105 percent of present levels over the next five years; and to 90-100 percent of present levels within ten years. The US-CAP Manifesto thus binds its inaugural members (as well as subsequent followers)—"market leaders" like: Alcoa, BP America, Caterpillar, Duke Energy, DuPont, FPL Group, General Electric, Lehman Brothers, Pacific Gas & Electric, and PNM Resources, along with four "leading" non-governmental organizations: Environmental Defense, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sunoco-funded Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and the World Resources Institute—to *increase* CO_2 over the next five years and provides them a tacit license to do nothing for ten more years thereafter! Few newspapers that announced the "CAP" have commented on this presumably minor detail. That is despite the fact that some IPCC scientists argue that we may need far more drastic reductions in our emissions of CO_2— as much 50-80 percent in ten years or less—as well as other greenhouse gases to prevent disastrous human-caused interference to the global climate system from spinning out of control. The US-CAP response to the unfolding climate catastrophe reveals a dangerous discursive and praxis disjuncture between "market leaders," select environmental organizations—upon whose boards some of the "market leaders" sit—and leading scientists and social movements, some of which are composed of representatives of environmental justice organizations and scholarly affiliates. This disjuncture has lead some, like critical scholar and public intellectual, Ian Angus, to argue via his "climate-and-capitalism" blog: "Ecosocialism or barbarism: there is no third way." It is thus appropriate to consider the geography of this divide. In so doing we are obliged to elaborate the positioning of some interlocutors and the implications of such positions for ecological policy, broadly defined, and climate debates, in particular.

In the Beginning, Before the Flood

The full story of existing attempts to erect a global infrastructure to respond to the climate change crisis has been told elsewhere. What follows is instead an abbreviated attempt to trace some empirical events that result from certain *doxas*—that is, *hegemonic discourses that stand as objective truths*—being touted in order to shape the emergence of climate change policies. The perceived and real shortcomings of the resultant policies as well as both the doxas and proponents that legitimized them are largely responsible for the rise of a discourse of climate justice. A close examination of these dynamics provides insight into how climate change policy has gone astray.

After years of pure and unapologetic obstruction, most transnational corporations (TNCs) adopted what they call a more "constructive" approach to this issue—one that is gilt-edged. Firms have expressed their willingness to support the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gases to the extent that it uses market-based remedies to address the climate crisis in lieu of aggressive regulatory actions. As Larry Lohmann puts it:

> The Kyoto pact is technocratic. It tends to see global warming's causes mainly in physical terms: the production of excessive amounts of greenhouse gases. On the whole, it declines to address institutions and power imbalances which have resulted in both the overuse and the unequal use of the atmosphere. Avoiding historical analysis, it averts its gaze from the politics of industry, the explosion in trade-related transport, subsidies for fossil fuel exploitation, the creation of consumer demand, and so on.

Analysts from The Netherlands-based Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) further argue that, "Industry and countries including the United States hope to avoid the placement of any ceiling whatsoever on the amount of their reductions that can be achieved 'abroad' through emissions trading." The Kyoto Protocol encourages countries to meet their reduction commitments primarily through emissions trading and a range of other neoliberal solutions that have gained widespread mainstream acceptance—especially among both hegemonic environmental and economic policymakers. The attraction and enthusiasm for the market-based approach is clear—the market in global greenhouse gases could grow to trillions of U.S. dollars over the next decades. Accordingly, firms and mainstream environmental organizations recognize a potential for enormous profits if they can shape the Kyoto mechanisms to their interests. Yet the market approach does not necessarily address the actual environmental problem. Indeed, carbon trading can entrench and exacerbate inequalities in global resources. As Lohmann further argues:

> The Kyoto Protocol, and the many corporate initiatives being developed in parallel, help make it possible for the well-off to buy the right to operate air conditioners, sports utility vehicles or jet fleets while telling ordinary people to stop using firewood or farming rice in methane-emitting paddies. They encourage companies who already use more than their share of the world's carbon sinks and stocks to buy still more of them—using cash which has itself been accumulated partly through a history of overexploiting those sinks and stocks. […] [Carbon trading] projects don't only damage local livelihoods. They're also used to sanction fossil fuel-related pollution elsewhere, both at mining and oil drilling sites and around energy generating plants. The impacts once again fall mainly on the poor. As always, using technical fixes to try to remedy what are essentially political problems tends merely to pile inequality on inequality.

In order to bolster the case for neoliberal approaches to climate change policy, TNCs, mainstream environmental groups, and government officials have closely collaborated and advanced common agendas; U.S. Climate Action Partnership is just one recent example. The rise of free-market environmentalism as detailed above and the *practices* among hegemonic actors vis-à-vis climate change policymaking are coeval. In the U.S., Ronald Reagan simply extended the principles of his predecessors by relying on cost-benefit analysis and other kinds of economic incentives to guide policymaking. Hence by the late 1980s and early 1990s, neoliberal economic policymaking and its concomitant reliance on the market was the *de rigueur* strategy for responding to environmental problems, including climate change. The ground for this sort of policymaking was forged in hegemonic pact-making endeavors. One early program that began in 1987, Project 88, was among other things a bipartisan-academic-NGO mechanism to "harness market forces to protect the environment." The thinking within efforts like Project 88 laid the foundation for subsequent partnerships. In 1999, Environmental Defense helped BP-Amoco pilot the first major corporate greenhouse-gas trading scheme. Over the course of more than a decade of climate change negotiations, other hegemonic environmental groups like World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the World Resources Institute, the supposedly "radical" Greenpeace, and others have openly partnered with and applauded the efforts of TNCs that have both sought to undermine climate change negotiations and are responsible for some of the largest carbon emissions.

TNCs, in part because of their enormous size and vast resources, have gone even further than just forging coalitions to proselytize the neoliberal path. They have also created various non-governmental organizations, engaged in extensive public relations campaigns through myriad trade associations and in cooperation with PR firms, and aggressively lobbied governments to support their positions. With revenues derived from the Sun Oil Company, the Pew Charitable Trust created the U.S.-based Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Like other corporate-created NGOs, or "astroturf" groups (as opposed to the more common American moniker, "grassroots"), Pew actively champions market solutions and works earnestly on behalf of the largest greenhouse gas polluters, including Royal Dutch Shell, and its own benefactor, Sunoco. Hardline corporate lobby groups, including the presently defunct Global Climate Coalition (GCC), the Business Roundtable, and the American Petroleum Institute, for years openly denied the very existence of climate change and opposed the Kyoto Protocol up-front. In 1998, a leaked memo revealed that the GCC, along with other groups such as the American Petroleum Institute and the Business Roundtable, planned to spend US$6 million in a two-year campaign to further undermine public confidence in climate science. The memo (and similar types of repeated and related behavior) promoted some observers to dub these lobby groups cum "think-tanks" as nothing more than *skeptic tanks*. In 2000 on the eve of COP-6, these groups went further to oppose a somewhat common industry demand for the recognition of "early action," which would grant companies emissions credits for early reductions. Further, since the beginning of the multilateral talks on climate change, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, the International Climate Change Partnership, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development have been heavily involved in influencing and molding climate change policy with a neoliberal bent. As the International Chamber of Commerce's Juahni Santaholma explains, the group has facilitated the participation of business in the climate process by being present at the UN negotiations with large and strong delegations.

These combined activities have seeded skepticism in the general public about even the very existence of climate change—not to mention what should be done about it. Worse, these alliances have served to obscure or even erase the extent of corporate complicity, collusion, and responsibility in the unfolding climate crisis.

This is a bold claim that is worthy of double qualification—empirically and symbolically. For example, one study reported that over the course of its 120-year corporate lifetime, the world's largest oil company, ExxonMobile, contributed three times as much carbon dioxide—20.3 billion tons—into the air as the current annual emissions of *all* fossil fuels. This is approximately three times the current annual global emissions and thirteen times the annual emissions from the United States. Such contributions mean that the giant ExxonMobile has caused between 4.7 and 5.3 percent of all manmade carbon dioxide emissions across the globe since its founding as the Standard Oil Trust in 1882.

This dramatic impact on planetary resources is presumably a function of "legal" behavior. Illegal corporate behavior is perhaps more pernicious and widespread than previously presumed, though it is hard to say how widespread exactly, since no single multilateral institution tracks it. In the face of these facts, it is remarkable—but not surprising—that after more than a decade of what might be best characterized euphemistically as corporate mendacity, a recent book published by the International Monetary Fund titled: *Who Will Pay? Coping with Aging Societies, Climate Change and Other Long-Term Fiscal Challenges* contains no mention of a single firm's involvement in climate change nor any actual empirical data on greenhouse gas contributions by corporations. Climate change is presented primarily as a geologic problem, even as political maneuvering by a host of actors is ignored and market solutions are offered forth.

Despite the powerful coalition greenhouse gas polluters were able to create to stymie debate and delay action on global warming, as more and more observers watch the climate crisis unfold, it appears increasingly unlikely that those trying to minimize the climate crisis will be able to maintain their intransigent position. In the early 1990s, political economic theorists, Schmitter and Karl, noted with a degree of prescience and foreshadowing that the "notions of economic liberty that were currently being put forward in neoliberal economic models are not synonymous with political freedom (i.e., democracy)—and may even impede it." More critical observers, like Amin, went so far as to remind us that it is "mere trickery" that "democracy equals capitalism" and "without capitalism there can be no democracy." These insights help provide early theoretical arguments for a reaction to neoliberal doxas and the practices of hegemonic economic and environmental actors that sought to utilize them in their response to climate change.

By the mid-1990s, a particularly vociferous and widespread debate was underway about the efficacy of the neoliberal model as well as its relation to and ability to promulgate development (positive or negative) in political, environmental, social, and economic spheres. At the time, the trickery of capitalism was unmistakenly manifesting, particularly in the global South. Fraternity Hedge Fund manager and billionaire George Soros cautioned: "[F]ree trade and free markets serve only to produce wealth…The WTO is not qualified to deal with environmental protection, food safety, human rights, [or] labor rights except insofar as international trade is involved." Ex-World Bank Vice President and Nobel laureate in economics, Joe Stiglitz, added:

> [T]he proponents of globalization have been, if anything, even more unbalanced […] To understand what went wrong, it's important to look at the three main institutions that govern globalization: the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. […] A half century after its founding, it is clear that the IMF has failed in its mission.

The aforementioned insights were by no means unique to Soros and Stiglitz. Their admonishment against the inherent shortcomings of neoliberal doxa upheld by particular experts did provide and continues to provide conceptual ammunition to (re)consider and (re)think pathways to avert economic and political roadblocks and the climate crisis—given the extent to which neoliberal solutions have been offered as viable and necessary "solutions."

The acute awareness of the extent, depth and pervasiveness of collusion to adopt and execute neoliberal policies that have demonstrably exacerbated injustice on a global scale among hegemonic actors and institutions within the environmental movement, multilateral institutions, the academy, and transnational corporations has compelled many within the environmental justice movement to react. What follows is a recent snapshot of the extent and degree of the reaction in terms of rethinking global climate change policy.

Doxa and Demands in Motion: A Tale of Two Conferences

On March 26, 2004, the first portion of a three-day conference called "Just Climate? Pursuing Environmental Justice in the Face of Global Climate Change" was held at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in the U.S. The conference was billed as "the first conference convened in the United States on Environmental Justice and Climate Change." Although "first" may have been less than accurate, this preliminary, explicit discussion of environmental justice and climate change marked an attempt to develop and advance the theoretical notion of *climate justice*, which the U.S.-based NGO, CorpWatch, defined in 1999 as:

> …holding fossil fuel corporations accountable for the central role they play in contributing to global warming. This signifies challenging these companies at every level—from the production and marketing of the fossil fuels themselves, to their underhanded political influence, to their PR prowess, to the unjust "solutions" they propose, to the fossil fuel-based globalization they are driving. Climate Justice [sic] means stripping transnational corporations of the tremendous power they hold over our lives, and in its place building democracy at the local, national and international levels.

By theoretically advancing climate justice as an environmental justice approach to global climate change, conference participants also created the means to empirically locate and situate its antithesis, *climate injustice*, which they characterized as:

> [the manner in which] greenhouse gangsters are pushing the world to the edge of global ecological havoc, they continue to relentlessly destroy the health and well-being of local communities and ecosystems where profits from oil are to be found—be it in the mangrove swamps of the Niger Delta, the far reaches of the Amazon basin, or the fragile environs of the Arctic.

In more general terms, climate injustice is the idea that harm from the deleterious effects of climate change and the production and materialist processes associated with it is unevenly distributed and deliberately falls disproportionately on the marginalized and the disadvantaged.

Among the large crowd present on the first morning were well-known centrist panelists invited for the inaugural discussion. These included Jonathan Patz, from The Johns Hopkins' Bloomberg School of Public Health; Duane Gubler, the Director of the Asia-Pacific Institute of Tropical Medicine and Infectious Diseases; Edward A. Parson, from the Schools of Law and Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and perhaps most notable of all, Robert T. Watson, the World Bank's Chief Scientist on climate change. The conference sought "to further the dialogue among activists, policy-makers, and academics from diverse communities about how global climate change will affect disadvantaged areas and peoples around the world." While primary funding for the conference came from the U.S. National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, the University of Michigan School of Public Health was a co-sponsor and shared a portion of the hosting costs with the School of Natural Resources and Environment. Thus, on the first day, Noreen Clark, the Dean of Public Health, and James Vincent, the Chair of the Department of Environmental Health Sciences at the school, welcomed conference participants and panelists alike.

Symbolically, the morning panel on day one was a showcase of the *crème de la crème* of scholarly knowledge and expertise on climate change and its effects on human health, among other things. Following the morning session, participants and subsequent panelists broke to reconvene for the remaining conference sessions held in the School of Natural Resources and Environment. Watson and *all* of the other panelists variously expressed their regrets and left for other "previous engagements." This rupture is significant on at least three levels. First, it is certainly regrettable; but secondly—and more importantly—it directly compromised the conference's explicit goal and objective of having a "complex interaction *between* environmental justice and global climate change, representing the perspectives of the scientific, policymaking, economic, social-science and community group perspectives" (emphasis added). Further, the rupture can be read to symbolize the inability to bridge disparate ways of comprehending the nature of climate change and responses to it. If various voices, including activists, lay people, credentialled scientists, and established policymakers cannot discuss within the confines of a small conference differences of opinion, perspectives, and understandings on the nature of the climate change crisis along with the courses of action that should or could be taken, the likelihood that they will ever have such a conversation in the midst of a large global meeting, such as one of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conferences (UNFCCC), seems distant, if not impossible. This does not bode well for successfully addressing climate change.

During a break in the conference, some of those who remained helped craft "The Climate Justice Declaration," which came into being after three intense days of discussions, reflections and deliberations. The Declaration makes the case that racial discrimination exacerbates the effects of damages from climate change. Among many demands, the Declaration significantly calls for an end to fossil fuel exploration and adds that "[i]ndustrialized country governments and transnational corporations owe the victims of climate change and victims of associated injustices full compensation, restoration, and reparation for the loss of land, livelihoods, and other damages."

In many ways, the overall goals and objectives as well as the outcomes of the Michigan conference were at odds with the perspectives represented by a subset of credentialled scientists. These scientists collectively express opinions sanctioned by the multilateral institutions with whom they have affiliations. They also advance, consciously or not, the ideology of economic neoliberalism that, to varying degrees, animates the policymaking within these institutions and defines the nature and tenure of the UNFCCC negotiations.

Not surprisingly, there was a degree of harmony among the morning interlocutors. Unlike *all* of the remaining panels, the morning session was entirely composed of credentialled experts. Further, *all* of these panelists concurred that one key to success in addressing climate change would be successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Arguably Watson's work on climate change serves as a kind of leitmotif for this perspective. Significantly, Watson reiterated his well-known view that trading mechanisms represent "an excellent opportunity for developed countries to reduce the costs of meeting emission targets." Given this viewpoint, it is perhaps unsurprising that to date not one of the morning's "leading authorities" on climate change has signed the conference's Climate Justice Declaration. Further, it seems highly unlikely that this coterie of establishment mandarins—to invoke Chomsky's phrasing—will ever sign such a declaration, simply because at its core, the document is antithetical to the spirit and the letter of their work as well as their expressed and maintained views on how to address climate change.

The Michigan Conference on Climate Justice was an explicit effort to call into question the legitimacy of certain kinds of experts and institutions that make far-reaching decisions on climate change with profound consequences for many, especially marginalized and disenfranchised populations far removed from officially recognized sites of knowledge, decision-making and power. But the conference did not explicitly challenge the economic doxa that holds sway over the way in which current global climate change policy is articulated.

That challenge came seven months later, on the other side of the globe. From October 4-7, 2004 in Durban, South Africa, an international group of approximately 30 scientists, experts and representatives from universities, environmental, development, and human rights organizations came together to examine a wide range of issues raised by the hegemony of market approaches to addressing climate change. As the memoranda requesting funds to support the event described, the Durban conference comprised an explicit effort to assess:

> 1. Strategic weaknesses and strengths of actors in the trade, including brokers, traders, consultants, governments, international financial institutions, bilateral agencies, and private firms pursuing schemes outside the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon finance and "sustainable development" institutions; […]
> 2. Alternatives to carbon trading which are being made invisible; [and]
> 3. How to facilitate exchanges among the diverse, far-flung communities affected by carbon trading, including communities adversely affected by carbon projects such as industrial plantations; communities opposing the oil drilling or coal mining licensed by carbon projects; communities whose health is damaged by hydrocarbon pollution resulting from the burning of oil or coal; and trade unions of industries buying carbon credits.

Like the Michigan conference, the Durban meeting produced a declaration: "The Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading." To quote the statement at length:

> History has seen attempts to commodify land, food, labour, forests, water, genes and ideas. Carbon trading follows in the footsteps of this history and turns the earth's carbon-cycling capacity into property to be bought or sold in a global market. Through this process of creating a new commodity—carbon—the Earth's ability and capacity to support a climate conducive to life and human societies is now passing into the same corporate hands that are destroying the climate.

It then adds:

> People around the world need to be made aware of this commodification and privatization and actively intervene to ensure the protection of the Earth's climate. Carbon trading will not contribute to achieving this protection of the Earth's climate. It is a false solution which entrenches and magnifies social inequalities in many ways: The carbon market creates transferable rights to dump carbon in the air, oceans, soil and vegetation far in excess of the capacity of these systems to hold it. […] The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), as well as many private sector trading schemes, encourage industrialised countries and their corporations to finance or create cheap carbon dumps such as large-scale tree plantations in the South as a lucrative alternative to reducing emissions in the North. […] In addition to these injustices, the internal weaknesses and contradictions of carbon trading are in fact likely to make global warming worse rather than "mitigate" it. […] 'giving carbon a price' will not prove to be any more effective, democratic, or conducive to human welfare, than giving genes, forests, biodiversity or clean rivers a price.

Unlike the Michigan meeting, the Durban meeting did not seek to foment dialogue(s) between myriad experts. Instead it sought to counter the very idea that commodification and market measures constitute the only strategies for adequately addressing the climate crisis. The Durban meeting participants advanced the view that free markets in greenhouse gases threatened to encourage "a race to the bottom" in environmental and social standards. As researchers from The Netherlands' based Transnational Institute, who participated at Durban, noted before the meeting:

> [W]hen a polluter buys credits in a trading scheme, this enables him to continue or even increase their [sic] own pollution. On a global scale credits generated in the trade in greenhouse gases will come from dubious projects in countries far away from the source of the original pollution. Not only are credits enabling pollution to continue at home, but the generation of those credits is highly suspect as well. Communities living with factories on their doorstep will continue to suffer the effects of pollution indefinitely.

Members of the Durban Group continue to articulate dissent against market solutions of the climate crisis and against carbon trading in particular in a 360-page volume published in late 2006 by the Swedish-based Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, titled: *Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation and Power*.

The Durban and Michigan meetings were explicit challenges to the particular doxas—economic and ideological, respectively—that give rise to hegemonic climate change policymaking. These meetings were far from autochthonous. They came out of an evolving, historicized theoretical critique and praxis of resistance to hegemonic thinking and global neoliberal policymaking, as well as from an acute awareness of the empirical outcomes and associated disproportionate human costs of such hegemonies. These conferences were by no means singular, unrelated, disparate events. Some of the participants, for example, took part in both meetings. Further, the conceptualizers, organizers, and participants in both events were and remain engaged in an explicit effort to advance and articulate the necessity for climate justice and against climate injustice at the multilateral level of the IPCC negotiations and in regional contexts, both at the level of the state and locally.

In many ways these two meetings symbolize and represent a longer and broader legacy of strategic resistance to hegemonic doxas. They stand against specialized ways of knowing and the outcomes of neoliberal economic predispositions. Insofar as the participants in the meetings articulate arguments and make demands *for* climate justice, the meetings also express novel and resistant subjectivities and discourses emblematic of late 20th- and early 21st-century movements for environmental justice.

The demands for climate justice are thus a subset of a wider set of discussions and demands for environmental justice. These demands are not just positions against authority—*anti-positions*—"against power," per se. To the contrary, the demand for climate justice is an expression of hope—indeed, desire and love—and a demand for objectives rooted in collective decision-making that are well beyond the provisional scope of power as presently conceived. The climate justice movement is therefore one of liberation as well as economic and ideological sovereignty. Prophetically, the struggle for climate justice dares to demand changing the world without reproducing hierarchical state or market power as it is currently known. In this way, it holds both a threat against hegemonic doxa and a novel promise of liberation.

Those articulating the demand for climate justice are by no means uniform in belief or message. Yet they represent a coherent if eclectic mix of ways of knowing, bound together by one common belief: that the present doxas are insufficient to resolve the crisis of climate change, and other paths are both necessary and possible. To the extent to which the dominant ideological and economic doxa fail to address the crisis, they are increasingly beleaguered and withering. Hence the backdrop against which the demands for climate justice emerge, as well as what these demands threaten and promise, move into the foreground of contemporary politics.

In Conclusion

Realizing the inequitable distribution of environmental degradation and mitigation efforts compels us to demand *just solutions* to environmental problems in lieu of *equitable solutions*. This has serious implications for institutions that work on global environmental problems. Equitable benefit-sharing schemes within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and other treaties are questionable and perpetuate injustice when we recognize historical patterns of injustice in the context of a world in which global apartheid is increasingly the rule. Mounting data confirms that marginalized communities benefit the least and incur the greatest costs from neoliberal-laced climate policy plans. It is becoming too little and too late to address these systemic inequalities with novel carbon trading schemes, especially those that target lesser-developed countries with dubious "carbon sink" projects in the name of facilitating global "fair and equitable" trading benefits.

An environmental justice analysis in the U.S. and globally attempts to identify and eliminate the legacies of systematic and disproportionately harmful effects of environmental degradation as well as mitigation efforts. It is not about redistributing or transferring benefits and burdens after environmental harm is done to particular communities—that is environmental equity, not justice. In an unjust world, environmental benefits (e.g., from conservation programs) need to be disproportionately remitted to those who have incurred disproportionate harm. Simultaneously, the means to "cost-sharing" must be radically and immediately reconceptualized. Treating environmental problems after communities have been harmed has to be replaced by moves to prevent environmental problems from occurring in the first place.

It is this acute cognizance of the empirical aspects of injustice that compels advocates of environmental justice to abandon doxas and practices that reinforce injustice. The pursuit of justice destabilizes and unsettles the inherent inequity of utilizing market approaches in a profoundly uneven world. In the context of civilization-threatening climate change, seeking justice becomes a liberatory praxis that opens new possibilities for novel forms of resistance—and also novel forms of freedom.